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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to enhance the evaluation of natural coastal systems
by introducing the idea of synergy among the different uses of theses systems.
The notion of a natural system and its links with human activity are explained.
It is then shown that it is not possible to value a subcomponent of the system,
be it a geographical area, or a single use. The idea of synergy, which stems from
the interrelations among the uses of the system and all the entities composing it, is
introduced. Because of this synergy, a simple addition of the values of the different
uses of the systems, although an unavoidable and difficult enough first step, show
thus insufficient. A methodology which tries to capture the value of the synergetic
effects is proposed. The difficulties arising in its implementation are discussed, and
it is shown that, despite them, valuing natural systems according to the proposed
methodology is necessary and helpful for decision making. The case of the Saugus
River Watershed, Massachusetts is studied as an illustration of the theoretical part
of the thesis. The obstacles imposed by the political structure are a major feature of
this case study. To close, directions for further research are suggested.
Thesis Supervisor: Judith T. Kildow
Title: Associate Professor of Ocean Policy
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Thesis objective Human activity has reached a size where its impacts on the en-
vironment cannot be neglected any more. Every day environmental issues become
more critical. This is true on a global scale with threats such as global warming,
but also at the local level. Coastal zones are especially put under stress because of
very high population density. Decision-makers are faced with the following questions:
Should society maintain the environmental integrity of natural coastal systems ? At
what cost ? Which criteria should be used for decisions to spend money to pre-
serve the environment rather than on other important issues (health care, education,
research...) ?
This thesis tries to add a piece to the elaboration of an answer to these puzzling
questions. It deals with the challenging problem of evaluating the benefits to society
of natural systems. More precisely, it studies the existence of a synergy among the
different uses of natural systems and their value to society. If indeed natural systems
are the theater of synergetic effects, traditional methods of valuation, which simply
add up the values of the different uses considered independently, are erroneous.
The aim of this work is to enhance the process of valuation of natural systems,
so that the decisions regarding the environment more realistically reflect people's
preferences and more surely result in an increase in the wealth of the society. It
is designed for decision-makers but not as a tool which can be used directly: it is
more a reflection which points out deficiencies, proposes enhancements, and shows
the directions for further research.
Thesis structure The thesis consists of two parts. A methodology to value natural
coastal systems, and a case study that illustrates the central points of the methodol-
ogy.
The document is divided into chapters. Chapter 1 studies the definition of a ge-
ographical area bounding the system and conceptualizes the links between human
activity and the system. Chapter 2 introduces the idea of synergy. Chapter 3 pro-
poses a methodology which tries to avoid the loss of the synergetic value during the
valuation process. Chapter 4 discusses the difficulties arising when trying to imple-
ment valuations of a natural systems. The accuracy and usefulness of such valuations
are discussed. Chapter 5 and 6 are dedicated to the study of the Saugus River System
(Boston area, Massachusetts). This study serves as an illustration of the first part of
the thesis. The thesis concludes with suggested directions for further research.
Chapter 2
System and Uses
Before starting to value a system, the system itself has to be chosen. This encompasses
the choice of a geographical area (section 1), and the clarification of the way we
consider our uses of the system (section 2).
2.1 System as a set of linked subcomponents
2.1.1 Notion of valuation unit
From the point of view of ecology, it would seem dangerous to choose a geographical
entity which has strong links with other systems and, more generally, the rest of the
world. This should suffice to explain why one cannot value any arbitrarily chosen area.
There is an obvious part to this: a reasonable analysis would not draw a boundary
through a given ecosystem (we designate an ecosystem as an area showing ecological
uniformity: a wetland, a saltmarsh, or a certain type of forest), cutting it into two
parts. The point made here is that respecting ecological integrity is not enough: if
two or more different ecosystems are linked, they have to be valued as a whole. This
point is illustrated by figure 2-1.
An ecological argument would not be strong enough to convince economists, but
there is some evidence [11] that economics itself requires that the system valued
be as weakly linked as possible to the rest of the world. The following example
Figure 2-1: Strongly linked ecosystems have to be valued as a whole
illustrates this point. Let's imagine a watershed system composed of two ecosystems:
an upstream forest and, downstream, a wetland. Let's try to estimate the value
of the wetland alone. One of its functions might be to retain sediments coming
from upstream, thus avoiding expensive dredging along the coast. When the amount
of sediments increases, so does the value of the wetland (assuming that losses in
fisheries are more than offset). The incentive is thus to increase erosion upstream
without limit. A result which is somehow disturbing. Let's assume now that the
rivers twisting through the forest constitutes the spawning ground of a species of fish
which is caught in the wetland. The valuation of the wetland alone is by no means
affected by the way the forest is managed. For example the value of the wetland
will decrease if the population of fish does so. But the reason for this decrease in
population may be the poor environmental quality of the forest even though the
wetland would be able to support the fish. However, since the wetland is valued
alone, there is no incentive to preserve the "spawning ground" function of the forest.
A stream of thought in environmental economics, called "free market environmen-
talism" [5], would argue that this last case is an externality problem and that the
creation of property rights for the spawning ground function would insure its proper
valuation through the market mechanism. We will show the many dangers of this ap-
proach later, but we can already realize that it will truly be accurate, will really match
the ecological reality of the system only if the internal dynamics of the spawning func-
tion, and ultimately the system itself are fully understood (which ultimately means
the overwhelming description of the cycles of the primary elements -carbon, oxygen
etc. themselves). This is not a problem of stochasticity since markets can deal with
uncertainty. This is not a problem of information according to the economic meaning:
even though all actors have free access to all information available, if there is a gap
between what we know about the system and its reality, the market mechanism will
lead to a value which will certainly be coherent with itself, but nonetheless wrong as
regards the ecological behavior of the system. On the contrary, by valuing the system
as a whole, there is less chance of mistakes due to our ignorance of the micro-level
dynamics.
In short, it is not possible to accurately value a subcomponent of a larger system.
This result logically leads to the conclusion that the only accurate valuation we can
reach (other problems left aside) is that of the largest system, i.e. the earth itself.
This is because the very air we breath travels all over the planet, connecting all
continents. For example, we shall see later that wetlands can be thought of as carbon
sinks. Local communities cannot gain benefit from this feature however, because the
benefit goes to humanity as a whole by influencing the amount of carbon dioxide at
the global level.
Our principle, that only the global system can be valued, is useless at the local
level. But it shows that errors can be reduced by valuing a system which is as weakly
linked as possible to other systems. In a coastal management perspective, the smallest
"valuation unit" (elementary valuation unit) consists of a watershed because of the
strong upstream/downstream link. This watershed approach is not new [13] and
permits insightful analysis [10]. It also seems unavoidable to extend the watershed
into the sea. How far it should be is a difficult question, the answer to which varies
in each case. As a matter of fact, two different watersheds may be so strongly linked
in their marine part, that they have to be valued together. In any case, given the
Figure 2-2: Different boundaries
mobility of marine life and the unbounded nature of marine ecosystems, some mistakes
are likely to remain at this end of the system.
2.1.2 Valuation units and the policy making process
The argument we just made is by itself very important. Before going further, it seems
worth discussing its consequences on policy decisions.
Of course, if legal boundaries matched that of valuation units, not only would
the valuation process be simplified but its results could be taken into account more
easily. In a way, communities would serve the society as a whole by defending their
own interest. It is not the case though, and a systemically sound valuation can
yield strange results. For example, consider figure 2-2 where unit 1 is shared by
community A and community B. A socially efficient valuation has to be conducted
according to the unit boundaries. If the optimal management decision coming out
of this valuation goes against the interest of one of the two communities, there is
little chance that it will be adopted unless both parties are compelled to sit at the
same table and reach an agreement. This is possible only if all the actors realize that
their true interest lies in the fate of the total valuation unit. Who wins and who
loses is then a matter of negotiation. In fact, there is a research challenge to improve
the negotiation processes related to the environment. The general public has to be
informed as well so that officials feel compelled to succeed. An initiative such as that
in appendix A show an example of action which can be undertaken at little cost.
Also interesting is the fact that, within community B, one use of the system (be it
recreation or fecal matter absorption) may have different values for units 1 and 2, so
that the pricing system, or the law, may vary among the members of community B.
This may seem unfair but we have here a distribution problem. Ideally, it should not
interfere with the optimal use of the natural assets. This is the same situation as the
one we previously described but within a community. Economists always emphasize
the fact that they do not deal with distribution issues [4, chapter 1]. Although they
usually refer to income, the phenomenon is the same with the environment. In real life
however, distribution and allocation are very often linked, maybe because allocative
solutions, such as short run maximum growth (whatever the costs in the long run),
permit to avoid difficult distribution decisions. For example, let's imagine that society
as a whole would benefit from the limitation of the number of recreationists on a site.
This limitation should be imposed. However, some classes may suffer more than
others from it. Some steps have to be taken if one wants to counteract the unfair
distributional effects of such a limitation. Indeed, it is easier to do nothing and let
the number of people increase: society gets worse off but nobody can be pointed out
as loser.
2.2 System as a set of uses and maintenance func-
tions
We try in this section to clarify the interface between human activity and the natural
system. This statement is already a sign that the analysis will be human-centered.
Indeed, we will focus on the uses of the system (such as recreation, water filtration,
food production, or flood protection). This approach is justified in the next chapter.
We will also include the system itself however, thanks to the idea of maintenance
functions.
Opportunity costs
Figure 2-3: Opportunity costs neglect the dynamics of the system
2.2.1 Uses of the system
We just saw that a geographical subcomponent of a system cannot be extracted
from it. It is the same for our uses of the system: it is impossible to value one
without considering the others. As a matter of fact, most studies in environmental
economics focus on only one use [25, 1]. In a work called "An Assessment of Methods
for Economic Valuation of the Northern Spotted Owl" [30], the author points out
that the analysis is complicated by the fact that people's willingness to pay for the
conservation of the spotted owl is influenced by their attachment to the old growth
forest. He concludes that data have to be worked on to eztract the value of the spotted
owl. But what does this value mean ? The spotted owl exiled from its habitat and
deprived of its influence on this habitat is certainly not worth a lot. Tear apart your
heart from your body, destroying all the connections between them, the value of your
organ is not more than that of a single piece of meat.
When a cost/benefit analysis is undertaken, generally to assess the worth of in-
tensifying one privileged use, the link with other uses is taken into account through
opportunity costs. But the tendency is to simply neglect the opportunity costs of
uses which are difficult to evaluate. This means attributing a null value to these uses.
Moreover this approach, even if carefully undertaken, accounts for the impacts of the
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privileged use on the others, but forgets that the system as a whole will react and pro-
vide feedback on the privileged use and other uses, and will determine how all those
uses will ultimately interact. If the maintenance of the system cannot be fulfilled,
will the system remain in a dynamic equilibrium close to the background situation,
or will it move to a very different state ? Figure 2-3 illustrates the shortcomings of
the opportunity cost approach. If we instead value the system as a whole, with all of
its uses, we do not have to worry about opportunity costs: all uses are linked and we
acknowledge that fundamental feature by reassessing the value of each of them even
when a change in the level of only one use is planned. To do this, knowledge of the
relations among the different uses must be available. Some research is needed in this
area. The optimal situation would consist in being able to determine these relations
without having to understand the system at the microlevel (a black-box approach).
This is likely to be only partially possible though, so that our methodology requires
the study of the internal dynamics of the system. The idea of maintenance function
will help in this.
2.2.2 Maintenance functions
Certain species, certain characteristics of the system are critical to its maintenance,
and thus to the persistence of the uses of the system. For example, the flushing of
a tidal marsh is critically important to the health of the marsh. Intensifying one
use of the system will alter the efficiency of the maintenance functions which in turn
will influence our degree of freedom to use the system. These maintenance functions
constitute the link between the dynamics of the system and its uses. That is why
they are present on figure 2-3. We will study the problem of their valuation in the
next chapter.
2.2.3 Indicators
Finally, we complete our description of the system by a set of indicators, the result of
monitoring. Indicators are an insight into the system. Indicators are concentrations
Figure 2-4: Description of the system
of certain chemical compounds, populations of certain species... We distinguish them
from the level of the different uses of the system, which are not state variables but in-
puts. Monitoring is common in environmental management, but there are some holes
in ,our knowledge of the intensity of our uses of the system. However, knowing what
we put into the system (or remove from it) is a necessary condition to understanding
the links among the uses.
2.3 Conclusion
To sum-up our description of the system:
1. The system is composed of at least one valuation unit (watershed + marine
zone) as weakly linked as possible to the rest of the world.
2. The system is valued as a whole but we focus on the human uses of the system.
3. These uses are linked together by the dynamics of the system, and the system
is maintained by a set of maintenance functions.
4. Indicators give information about the state of the system.
Figure 2-4 is a graphical representation of our approach.
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Chapter 3
Value and Synergy
In this chapter, we first describe the concepts of value. Then we relate these descrip-
tions to our problem. This will enable us to understand why we misvalue natural
systems and suggest a way to try to enhance the situation.
3.1 The concept of value
There is not one idea of value but many. The first distinction is between non-
preference and preference values. We just give definitions first, discussion comes
in the next section.
3.1.1 Non-preference values
Non-preference values could be called intrinsic values. We can distinguish two kinds of
intrinsic values: the intrinsic value of the system itself and intrinsic values of functions
fulfilled by entities inside the system. By intrinsic value of the system itself, we mean
that, independently of mankind, the system might have an abstract existence value
prevailing over the economic ideal of efficiency of allocation, the existence of the
system being given an absolute priority.
The other kind of non-preference values are called "functional values" [3, p. 233].
They come from the physical or chemical relationships between non-human entities
(value of vegetation for a certain species, value of a predator as regulator of lower
Figure 3-1: From held values to assigned values
species...). Whatever our preferences, they do exist because they play a role in the
state of the system, and their importance depends on the dynamics of the system
alone. This is the task of ecologists to find these relational value by studying the
relationships among the entities of the system.
3.1.2 Preference values
Preference values are human related. There are three realms of preference values:
held values, relational values, and assigned values.
Held values constitute an individual's conception of the preferable. Ideals such as
generosity, honesty. Held values are at the basis of our conduct and function as labels
for our determining of relational and assigned values.
Relational values emerges from the interaction between a subject and an object
[3, p. 233]. They exist at the feeling level but generally produce an expression of
value.
Given a set of relational and held values, and a certain context (information,
involvement in a group, possibility to represent a group of people), it is possible for
an individual to assign value to an object in comparison to other objects. A possible
progression from held to assigned values is presented on figure3-1.
The slightly confusing aspect of this classification lies in the fact that it is possible
to put an assigned value on held values, by saying, for instance, "altruism is better
than egoism". But this valuation is still done under the norms provided by held
values.
3.2 Values and economics
Economics do not deal with non-preference values. As stated by Brown [3, page 231]:
The individual human being is seen, for all practical purposes, as the
originator of preference and, therefore, of value.
We may decide that the system itself, as a whole, has an intrinsic, non-preference
value. This ethical apriorism would lead to the emergence of some "natural rights",
similar to human rights, or to a theory close to the concept of "imperative of re-
sponsibility" [18] toward the future generation. The former idea would mean explicit
trade off between human freedom, welfare, and death against the environment, since
the human rights would not be the only absolute reference any more. The latter idea
leads to trading off wealth today against quality of life and lives in the future. We
do not develop these ideas here because we placed this work in an economic context,
close to an utilitarian decision making process.
Having chosen this economic context, we should not consider the functional values
either. They have no direct assigned values but only an implicit "instrumental" value
through the uses of the system. As a matter of fact, since they are part of the
system, their intrinsic value should be reflected in the assigned values of the different
uses of the system. It is not what happens though due to the way we value natural
systems, and that is why we do have to take them into account explicitly. In fact,
the maintenance functions would be valued through the uses of the system only if
the system was considered as capital, the different uses being the outputs of this
capital. Let's note that, in this case, there would be no reason for the total value
of the system to be the sum of the values of the uses. On the contrary, what we do
is value the system only through our uses of it. Instead of maximizing our capital,
i.e. having the healthiest system, we maximize the outputs of the system. Of course
part of this misvaluation of natural systems comes from the discrepancy between the
ecological time frame and the one we use for economic purposes. Five years is the
typical term for investment decisions, economic measures or political regulations. But
natural systems cannot adapt to this convenient, artificial sectioning of time. They
continually evolve at a very slow pace, but they can also shift from one state to another
in a very short time. For example, a breach in a barrier island is a discontinuity in the
evolution of a coastal system which can lead to tremendous changes within a week.
So far, our valuations have focused on the short term instead of taking the long term
fate of natural systems into account. On the other hand, we are not prepared to deal
with very fast, exponential changes either.
We are in fact faced with a "common property" problem, not because many people
use the system (like in the original description of the Tragedy of the Commons [15],
but because there are many uses of the system, which we try to maximize without
regard for their interrelationships and impacts on the system. In the original tragedy
of the commons [15], the system collapses because the benefit each individual gains
from an increase in his or her use of the system is not properly balanced by a higher
cost to society. The incentive is thus to overuse the system. Here we have the
same problem: an increase in a specific use is considered marginal while, in fact, it
impacts the system as a whole. And this goes on as long as the resource is not scarce
enough so that the economic process can become active. The problem is that this
level of scarcity depends on human preferences, and not on the ecological, biological
state of the system (minimum population of a species to ensure sustainability, size
of habitat...). What can happen and does happen (consider the example of fisheries)
is that the system collapses before the level of scarcity demanded by the economic
process is reached.
Even if the time frame problem were solved, the fact that all uses are interrelated,
the uncontrollable gap between human preferences and real behavior of the system
would still lead to errors in valuation. In short, we can summarize the situation as
follows:
- The system has no accessible economic value (assigned in an economic context)
because it is a whole, while a traditional economic analysis would consider its uses
separately.
- However, we have access to the economic value of the different uses of the system
only (with which level of accuracy is a problem discussed in chapter 5).
- Simply adding the value of the different uses thus leads to a misvaluation of the
system.
Since the use values are what we have access to, we have no choice but to start from
them, when trying to value the system. In order to capture the remaining part of the
value of the system - the part related to the fact that the system cannot be cut into
pieces because it is an integrated entity maintained by the maintenance functions-
we introduce the idea of synergy among the different uses of the system.
3.3 Synergy
3.3.1 The idea of synergy
Main stream economics either ignore the relations between economic activity and
the environment, or consider the environment as external to the economic process.
This is not true of new developments such as ecological economics or bio-economics
[12] which try to take into account the fact that human activity is part of the global
system. Our idea of synergy is in accord with these attempts: synergy between the
different uses of the system means ultimately a better cooperation (an idea which is
now as important to biologists as natural selection and competition among species)
between man and the environment.
The following extract [23, page 398] is a striking example of disappearance of
synergy:
As a result of the problems associated with nutrient loading, recre-
ational use of the bay has declined. This is demonstrated by the decline
in attendance at St. Albans Bay state Park, located at the head of the
bay. In 1960 total attendance for the park was 27,456, and in 1970 it was
25,982. After 1970, as the eutrophication problem accelerated and became
noticeable, attendance steadily declined to a total of 3,261 in 1979. As a
result of declining use, the State of Vermont ceased active management of
the park in 1980.
The synergetic effects are linked to three very important characteristics of the
system:
- resistance,
- resilience, and
- persistence.
The more diverse the system, the stronger it is in these three domains. And to
specialize the system in a specific use reduces its diversity. For example, overload in
nutrients produces eutrophication which favors strongly one type of vegetation but
destroys many other species. What do we mean here by diversity ? If the system
alone were at stake, biological diversity would constitute the right concept. But once
more, we placed ourselves in an economic context, so we have to consider people's
preferences and uses as well. Biological diversity is independent of human preferences:
it is possible to build norms based on differences in genetic heritage to measure it
objectively [8]. We want a concept that links diversity to the assigned values of
species, uses and characteristics of the system. The economic reality is that however
important to the maintenance of the system micro-organisms are, people do not put as
high an assigned value on them as on mammals or birds. Let's call complez a system
which is diverse enough to support highly valued forms of life. Complexity can then
be used as a measure of the level of synergetic effects in the system. Complexity is in
fact not very far from the real biological diversity (the conceptual approach is different
though), because a system where birds, mammals, or aesthetically valuable flora exist
has to have a high biological diversity, and thus is the site of strong synergetic effects.
For this reason, we can state that: the more complex the system, the bigger the value
of the synergetic effects among the different uses.
The fact that these synergetic effects have a value is apparent when one studies
Figure 3-2: Value of synergy
the many difficulties we have in building ecosystems [31]. Very often, after a few
years, an artificial wetland is nothing more than a pool with one or two dominant
kind of plants but no complex food web, no mammals or birds. And these failures
are not only attributable to the neglect of ecologists'specifications [24, page 1892].
All entities of a wetland develop in such a close relationship that we are unable to
reproduce it. We have no reference of studies trying to capture the value of these
synergetic effects.
In short, we can sum-up the idea of synergy by stating that, ceteris paribus,
society is better off with system A (see figure 3-2), than with the sum of systems B
and C, even though the economic benefits of A are equal to that of B and C added
together. Uses 1 and 2 are less harmful to system A because the system is more
complex. The two uses are more efficiently carried out. And, finally, system A is less
sensitive to incremental changes in uses and to its own stochastic variations. These
three reasons explain the difference. We now have to recognize that, despite our
symmetrical treatment of uses 1 and 2, all uses cannot generally be put on the same
level.
3.3.2 The hierarchical order
System A
Use I
Use 2
System B
Use 1
System C
Use 2
--
Class 1 Ground water recharge
Retention of nutrients from agricultural runoffs
Retention of heavy metals and hazardous organic compounds
Acid mine drainage
Sulfur sink
Class 2 Carbon sink
Flood water protection
Sediment retention
Storm damages protection
Class 3 Erosion protection
Timber production
Fur production
Sea food production
Nut, wild rice, blueberries, cranberries, honey production
Class 4 Spawning ground
Research
Education
Aesthetics
Swimming, boating, beaching, picknicking, hiking
Hunting
Wildlife watching
Class 5 Additional species support
Table 3.1: Ordering of uses for wetlands
U
It is much easier to create an artificial wetland dedicated to the retention of nutrients
from agricultural runoffs than one which has aesthetics and recreational quality [14].
All uses of a wetland, and more generally any system, do not require the same degree
of complexity. Table 3.1 shows a classification of uses for wetlands. It may not be
complete and there is little chance that all these uses can be found at the same time
in a given system. This table has to be built for each case.
The following example illustrates the idea behind the ordering of uses. Retention
of nutrients requires only vegetation and microscopic forms of life. A system with
only these forms of life would have little value to wildlife watchers: this latter activity
requires the whole food-web that leads to birds and mammals. As we said, our idea
of complexity is not only intrinsic to the system, but takes people's preferences into
account: birds may be less important than some micro-organisms to the maintenance
of the system, but they are more important to people.
This hierarchical order has impacts on the synergy among uses in the following
ways. First, uses are likely to disappear in packages and not one after another, so
that the loss of one use generally means the disappearance of several others (we
will develop the consequences of this characteristic on our methodology in the next
chapter). Second, simplifying a system for one use has different impacts depending on
the class of this use in that it will destroy all uses of the higher classes. Overloading of
nutrients for example, will lead to eutrophication and the likely collapse of commercial
production and recreation. Two remarks must be made here: first things are not
clear cut of course, it would be surprising given the complexity of the system - for
example, too much boating (class 4) at the edge of a marsh can ultimately destroy the
vegetation (class 1) that permits ground water recharge -; second a little increase in
nutrient loading can evidently increase commercial production, but isn't it precisely
an example of a synergetic effect ? The human problem is one of thresholds: at
which point do we jeopardize the system (destroy the synergetic effects) by deciding
to increase a specific use ? Lastly, there is some evidence that the more complex the
system, the more efficiently a lower use is carried out (for example, the presence of
fish and shellfish may favor the assimilation of toxic compounds by a wetland).
Increasing the level of a use in excess thus has the following consequences:
1. diminishing marginal returns on the privileged use,
2. increase of risk of seeing this use collapse,
3. loss due to the disappearance of higher uses,
4. decline in efficiency for the lower uses, and
5. decrease in synergetic effects among all the remaining uses.
This is much more than items 1 and 3 which are the only one classically considered,
in the best cases.
3.4 Conclusion
Having no other economic value but the monetary benefits of our uses of the system,
we have to start with them to value the system. In order to correct for the fact that
this approach is intrinsically erroneous (the only relevant value is that of the system
as a whole), we introduced the idea of synergy among the uses. This synergy cannot
be measured in monetary terms though. We propose a measure in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Risk
In this section, we show how the idea of risk can be used in a valuation process to
avoid losing the synergetic effects provided by a natural system. We first explain
what we mean by risk. We then examine the problems of time discounting, which
are linked to a notion of risk. Finally, we suggest directions of research which could
validate our approach.
4.1 Notion
As we saw, complexity could be a measure of the synergies among the different uses
of the system. But we think that the concept of complexity remains abstract and far
from the decision making process.
We introduce a notion of "risk of collapse". By collapse, we mean total disap-
pearance or quasi-total (like in the Vermont case we saw earlier). And the kind of
analysis we suggest can be illustrated as follows. Let's imagine a system with several
uses. Starting at point A (see figure 4-1), we imagine that we increase one of the uses
(for example nutrient retention). For a time, benefits rise without any harm to the
system. But at one point (B), the synergetic effects among the uses begin to decrease
because we simplify the system by specializing it: benefits continue to rise but risk
does also, so that an analysis on the benefit axis alone is not valid anymore. Is society
better off on point B or C ?
Figure 4-1: Risk
The example above does not elaborate on the idea of risk. Of course a time span
has to be attached to it, so that our measure becomes "likelihood of collapse within
the next n years" (we will see the advantages of this later in this chapter). Secondly
we did not state by what the risk was born: collapse of the system ? Of a use ? Uses
disappear one after another, the system itself changes significantly but can survive
even in a very degraded environmental quality. Risk attached to each use is the only
choice. Our measure is finally "likelihood of collapse of a given use within the next n
years".
We thus analyze our system in a space composed, for each use, of a benefit and
a risk dimension. So that even for as few as 2 uses, there are already 4 dimensions.
Consequently, the decisions should be based not only on benefit vs. benefit analysis
(influence of a use on the benefit of another use) but also on benefit vs. risk. For
example, an increase in sediment loading can lead to turbid waters, which makes the
number of recreationists decrease but it can also alter the system so that swimming
becomes really unpleasant: the benefits of the recreational uses will decrease, but
there is also a risk that this use may disappear completely. Opportunity costs, based
on expected flows, cannot deal with this risk of collapse because it is related to a
highly non-linear behavior of the system (hence the name collapse). Actually, for
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Figure 4-2: Benefit-risk diagram for a given use
a given use, the benefit-risk diagram is likely to look as shown on figure 4-2. The
presentation of our methodology is now completed: a system has to be evaluated not
only in terms of monetary benefits, but also in terms of risk. In fact there exist a
classical way to take risk into account: time discounting. We discuss this issue in the
next section.
4.2 Natural systems and discount rates
We haven't mentioned the problem of discounting the benefits of a use until now.
Of course, benefits in the following years have to be discounted to be expressed in
present value. We approach this subject now because discount rates are linked to the
notion of risk.
The choice of the discount rate is a vast problem in environmental economics [4,
page 179]. Some authors claim that the choice of the discount rate is an ethical
question [12], others that this concept is just inadequate to value natural assets [17].
In theory, the discount rate is a reflexion of the time preference of the society and
of the risk attached to the cash flows of the asset. The problem is that the notion
of risk in the orthodox economic context is very different from the non-deterministic
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behavior of natural systems: it consists in variance around a mean value, with a
smoothly shaped probability distribution. To compare it with the finance field, our
risk is rather that of bankruptcy, total liquidation of assets. And finance students
know that when such risks come into play, usual measures, such as the Net Present
Value criterion, are useless [2].
Is it possible to include the unpredictable nature of ecological systems in the
discount rate ? Drepper and Mansson [7] tried to do that. The result is a negative
discount rate for natural systems. An astonishing result at first, but which simply
mean that a natural asset tomorrow is worth more to society than the same today.
Does it not make sense ? However, using their methodology requires restricting
assumptions and an extensive knowledge of the system. Our approach, which does
not try to aggregate non-linear risk but acknowledges its existence by the use of a
new axis (risk), is more operational. Of course, since there are two axes of measures
instead of one, one cannot simply read the "best" option: a choice has to be made, a
trade off between benefit and risk.
Another advantage of our approach is that it requires one to choose a time-span:
5, 25, 50 years. A computation of present value is supposed to aggregate cash flows
until the end of time but, in fact, the discount factors become rapidly so small that
the flows past a certain year become negligible. Which year it is depends on the
nature of the project (whether there are big cash flows in the near future or not) and
not on the system itself. Appendix B explains the mechanics of the computation.
Our measure of risk includes an explicit time-span which eliminates hypocrisy about
the real time span used to evaluate the project. This enhancement seem significant.
4.3 Under which conditions can our methodology
be favorable ?
Our methodology consists of two steps. First, the determination of the value to
society of each use. Second, the study of the relationships among the uses in terms
of benefits as well as in terms of risk. The second step requires more knowledge than
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Figure 4-3: Simple benefit-risk diagram
a cost-benefit analysis. This section depicts the areas where this new knowledge is
necessary.
We already said that we first have to know at which levels we use the system (which
is different from monitoring as we saw). Relationships among uses are the critical part.
But if it is possible to have an idea of them without having to understand minuted
details of the system, the research effort is reduced. The first task is to evaluate this
possibility. This is not to say that trying to understand how the system functions
per se is useless. If there is a discrepancy between what we expect at the macro level
and what is understood or measured at the micro level, an extreme caution has to
be observed. But in our methodology, what counts are the relationships among uses.
If it is possible to determine them while considering the system as a black box, we
should profit from this.
The notion of collapse, and the discontinuities in behavior have to be evaluated
also: When do we reach the threshold ? Are there precursors for the collapse (indi-
cators) ? Can we predict how far from a deterministic behavior a system is ? What
are the links between the stochastic variations of the system and the moment when
there is an irreversible shift to a very different state ? Expecting curves as detailed
as the one on figure 4-1 is not realistic. However, even as simple a diagram as that
:1,
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on figure 4-3 can be helpful.
While benefits can be added, it is not possible to aggregate the risks on the
different uses. One has to decide which ones are the most critical to society, and
the decision making process. But the hierarchical order might help simplify things,
because the risk for uses of the same class might be the same. Instead of collapse
of a use, we then deal with that of all the uses of a class. And we can also test an
increase in a use against the change in risk of a package of other uses belonging to
the same class. For example, what is the increase in risk for amenities (as a class)
when increasing the nutrient load of a small lake ?
To sum up, the research needed is close to ecology, but with a bias toward studying
the relationships among uses rather than trying to understand the system for itself.
The risk component is another domain of study.
4.4 Conclusion
We now have the framework for our methodology. It depends on the relationships
among uses, and the notion of risk of collapse. Benefit vs. benefit and benefit vs. risk
relations have to be determine. The challenge is to take the dynamics of the system
and the synergetic effects among the different uses into account without abandoning
the advantages an economics type analysis.
We showed that research is needed to carry out step 2 of the process. But step 1
is a difficult one also. We study this problem in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
Problems of valuation
So far we have not explained how to carry out the valuation of each use. We do this
in the first section of this chapter. We will see that there are many difficulties, so
many that the whole process of trying to value natural systems can be criticized. The
second section tries to show that, despite these difficulties, the kind of valuation we
propose could be more useful than a classical economics approach.
5.1 How to value each use ?
An important part of the methodology we described consisted of valuing each use.
Uses can be classified in four categories according to their valuation:
1. uses for which there exists a market (commercial production),
2. uses for which there exists no market but which can be valued through replace-
ment costs (non-commercial matter related uses),
3. amenities with a broad meaning (from research to aesthetics),
4. transcendental uses.
We now describe each category.
5.1.1 Commercial production
This category encompasses all that is harvested, timbered, fished in the system and
for which there exists a market. In reference to table 3.1, it corresponds to class 4.
In this class, the value to society seem easy to compute since there is a market
for each good. The study of the market prices permit us to draw a demand and a
supply curve and, thanks to them, customer surplus and other monetary values can
be extracted. However, stating that the values obtained correspond to the real value
to society, implies that the considered markets are perfect. It may not be the case
very often for various reasons. We will just point out one. Those are markets where
government intervention occurs a lot. This comes from the fact that, watching the
depletion of natural resources, governments decided to intervene. They did it with
their tool: regulation. Market prices are thus distorted by non-economic constraints,
but, when using market prices, we depend upon an economic measure. How big is
the mistake we make ? It is probably difficult to know in monetary terms. The
problem lies in the relationships between the use of the system as a resource and the
persistence of the ecological system as a whole. Too much fishing would lead to the
extinction of fish resources but would also have further dramatic consequences on the
ecology of the system. Government action tries to prevent these losses, so that the
value of the system does not decrease. However, one consequence of the limitation of
catch is a decrease in the value of the fishing industry, and since we tend to measure
the value of the system through its uses (fishing is one of them), the value of the
system seems to decrease according to traditional economic valuations. In fact, the
real question appears to be: why was the market mechanism not able to insure the
sustainable exploitation of the resource ? We will come back to this question in the
next section. For now, we see that, even in the most favorable case, we are likely to
make mistakes in our valuation.
5.1.2 Non-commercial matter related uses
We designate in this category of uses classes 1 to 3 (table 3.1). We called these
uses non-commercial because there is generally no market value attached to them:
owners of wetlands do not get money for the nutrients their land retains, or the flood
protection the land provide.
However, by deriving the cost of an artificial system providing the same service to
society, or by carefully accounting for the damages which are avoided thanks to the
existence of the system, it is possible to estimate the benefits of this class of uses of
the system. This kind of work is very practical and can be labor intensive. Very few
studies of this type appear in the scientific literature.
It is possible to feel very strongly about the virtues of synergy in this category:
for example when valuing the storm protection provided by a salt-marsh, one may
compare that with the cost of building a dike and maintaining it (a natural system is
self repairing). But one has also to realize that the dike will provide neither oppor-
tunity for bird watching, nor production of sea-food, nor a pollution buffer between
the land and the sea... Of course, in a benefit/cost analysis, opportunity costs are
supposed to account for these losses (when the study is done carefully), but they
still do not approach the system as a whole, with all its interactive uses, the synergy
among them, and the maintenance functions which maintains its integrity.
5.1.3 Amenities
Class 5 in table 3.1, are mainly recreational activities. But we include also other
uses such as aesthetics and research/education. The benefits to society of research
and education seem really difficult to evaluate. They are rarely even mentioned in
cost/benefit analyses. No study was found approaching this problem. Most work has
been carried out on recreational activities.
The amount of theoretical work on the problem of valuation of recreational activ-
ities is enormous. There are two basic ways to find the benefits of a free recreational
activity which takes place in a given area: transportation costs and contingent valu-
ation. Transportation costs assume that what people are willing to pay for enjoying
a beach, a wetland, or a park, corresponds to what they spend when traveling to the
area [29]. The method looks rather objective and rigorous but has been abandoned
nowadays: what is measured in this method is the elasticity of recreation demand on
traveling costs and nothing else. Besides, traveling procures some enjoyment in itself,
the measure of which has nothing to do with the area visited.
Contingent valuation consists of carrying out a survey asking people what they
would be ready to pay to preserve a recreational area (willingness to pay), or what
they would accept as compensation for the loss of the area (willingness to accept).
The method is widely used for its flexibility. For example, it theoretically allows the
valuation of a single species, as we saw with the spotted owl. This is not really an
advantage since, as we said, valuing a single species is just an empty problem. Theo-
retical articles deal with many aspects of the method: existence of option values (the
option to chose between using or not the amenity in the future has a value, since it
requires the persistence of the amenity) [28], influence of information [19], the impor-
tance of sample discrimination (surveying also potential users) [23]... The results of
these surveys remain disputable. The format for the survey has a strong influence on
the results, people tend to give "political" answers (I disagree with the way things
are handled so I will pay nothing anyway), people understate their willingness to pay
from fear of a real tax (despite the precautions taken by the surveyers) and, theoret-
ically more troublesome, experience shows that willingness to pay and willingness to
accept are never equal, while they should be of course since they are only two ways
to describe a single economic transaction [16].
A very insightful study was conducted years ago by Brown [3]. Volunteers were
shown pairs of pictures of the same outdoor scene in two different states of envi-
ronmental quality, as well as pairs of the same consumer product with two different
qualities (leading brand against very inexpensive copies for example). They were
then asked to rank the differences in quality both on a dollar scale, and an "assigned
importance" scale. The results were that the differences in quality of the outdoor
scene were always considered more "important" than those for the commodities, but
that, on the dollar side, subjects were ready to pay more for the improved quality of
the commodities than the environment. The result is relevant to our valuation and
very disturbing. As Brown puts it:
It [also] suggests[, however,] that there is a concept of value regarding
environmental amenities which is different from real willingness to pay.
This goes further than just saying that contingent valuation is inaccurate because
people just have no idea of what they are willing to pay: it means that the economic
measure is inadequate for environmental quality and benefits resulting from recreation
in a natural ecosystem. This is a very strong limitation to any indirect economic
valuation of environmental assets. And our methodology starts with such a valuation.
But by introducing a second axis of evaluation (risk), we hope to limit the "Brownian"
errors when valuing environmental amenities.
5.1.4 transcendental uses
We mean by this title a use the benefit of which transcends the frontier of the chosen
system. What we have in mind is the capacity of wetlands to act as atmospheric
carbon or sulphur sinks. As far as we know, this characteristic could be of great benefit
to mankind. It may be a good way to mitigate global warming [14]. But the benefits
go to mankind as a whole and not to the community which develops or preserves
the wetlands. In neo-classical economic terms it is an externality problem. In our
framework, we cannot value this use because our valuation unit is not big enough
and has, through the atmosphere, a link with the rest of the global system. We reach
here a limit of our methodology: although, as a part of mankind, the community
considered receives a part of the benefits due to the reduction in atmospheric carbon
dioxide, we cannot account for it because it goes beyond the limits of our local system.
5.1.5 Useless efforts ?
Valuing each use, a critical unavoidable first step of our methodology, requires a lot
of time and work, while the results are disputable in most cases. Why make such
efforts then ? And more generally, is it worth trying to carry out valuations of natural
systems ? We try to show in the next section why these valuations are important.
Once this importance is recognized, the voluntarist attitude consists of reaching the
best available estimate of value, and trying to improve the valuation methods we just
discussed. Our methodology contributes to the improvement of the valuation for each
use in fact. First, uses are valued as a part of the system, so that the errors coming
from opportunity costs are reduced. Second, it is not necessary to "extract" values.
To be specific, the spotted owl (see chapter 3) will not be valued alone but as a part
of the benefits of hiking in the old growth forest while watching all wildlife, enjoying
the scenery, the noises, etc. It is the combination of all these sensations that produce
the pleasure of enjoying the old growth forest. Besides, these sensations exist because
the system exists and offers a habitat for the wildlife. Studying the spotted owl alone
can indeed be useful, but only as a signal, or indicator, of the health of the larger
system; not in economic terms.
5.2 Alternative approaches to the valuation of
natural systems
Valuation methods such as the one we present, or more generally, the use of eco-
nomic analysis in decision making can be criticized on two opposing grounds. On
the one hand, one can say that economics in the broad meaning (that is to say all
"orthodox" branches of economics: neo-classical, Keynesian completed by a body of
environmental tools; but also branches which try to acknowledge the fact that the
economic activity is part of the global ecosystem: bio-economics, post-Keynesian) are
not able to handle environmental decisions. On the other hand, it can at the opposite
be stated that only pure (i.e. neo-classical) economics are able to yield the true value
of natural systems. We study the first argument briefly. We spend more effort to
show the dangers of the second one.
5.2.1 What alternative to economics based decision mak-
ing ?
On the grounds that any method based on indirect economic valuation of natural
systems will be inaccurate, a view which is defensible as we saw in the previous
section, decision-makers can refuse to use them. Decisions are then based on the
belief that the people who make the decisions have the best information and thus are
in the best place to choose for others, the aim always being to maximize society's
welfare. That's what Jonas suggests in the second part of his work [18]: decisions
concerning the environment should be made by a reduced committee of experts, an
"elite". We deliberately placed our work in an economic context. So this alternative,
with a socio-political context, goes beyond our study. However we try to justify our
approach briefly in the next paragraph.
Relying on economics (in a broad sense) means that we consider that people's
behavior ultimately reflects their preferences. Of course these preferences are based
on the way people perceive the natural system, so the dilemma lies between 1) a
society where a decision maker's duty is first to inform people as plainly as possible
and then to make decisions on the basis of assigned values, measured as accurately as
possible (with an acknowledged risk of errors), and 2) one where a few technocratic
experts make decisions for others. The model which has more chance to derive and
be the theater of disastrous mistakes is left to the reader.
5.2.2 Free market environmentalism
At the opposite end of the spectrum, some will argue that an indirect valuation process
is inaccurate not because it is economics but because it is on the border of economics.
Within the neo-classical theory, the only way to have access to an accurate economic
value is through the market mechanism. A "Free market environmentalism" solution
consists of creating property rights for environmental assets, just like they exist for
man-made capital. The market mechanism will not only insure that they are given
their true value, but also that social efficiency (allocative efficiency) is reached at the
least cost.
It is true that the market mechanism has something fascinating as regards its neat
way to translate people's preferences into values, and the fact that this translation is
performed without any other cost than the possibility of exchanging goods. However,
we think that this solution is not practical. The reasons are many and very well
developed, on a global perspective, by Daly [6, 5].
* The first and obvious one concerns problems of scale: in theory, the economic
system can be expanded or reduced without constraints because all the values
implied are relative values. But the earth is a finite closed system, in which
economic activity takes place, so that there is actually an absolute limit to
growth which neo-classical economics cannot integrate.
* The second problem is one of dynamics: Whether the market approach can be
applied to the environment, or is it intrinsically unadaptable to environmental
issues ? Can neo-classical or even Keynesian economics, which were originally
interested only in the human activity, be expanded to deal with the links be-
tween economic activity and environmental systems, or is a change of paradigm
needed ? We mentioned earlier an example of market failure: the depletion of
commercial fish. In this case, as in all environmental issues in fact, the "Tragedy
of the Commons" [15] phenomenon shows that the market mechanism cannot
handle natural resources as long as they are not scarce. As we said before,
the problem is that the required level of scarcity has to do with our economic
activity, but nothing to do with the ecological reality of the system providing
this resource. There is no insurance that the market mechanism will come into
play before the species become extinct, or before the system collapses. More-
over, the relationships among the uses which we try to put forward in this work,
apply to all the uses of the system. A transaction of property rights (between
two uses for instance) will leave many variables aside (influence on other uses
through the dynamics of the system). There is no reason why a set erroneous
transactions might lead to the right valuation of the system in terms of benefits
to the society.
There are other reasons why the market approach is likely to fail. In the next para-
graphs we present arguments which are critical at the local level. We discuss problems
of discontinuous behavior, specialization, and people's welfare.
Discontinuous behavior of natural systems Can the market mechanism deal
with the non deterministic behavior of natural systems ? We don't say here that
traditional economics can handle only linear curves of demand or supply. This is
obviously not true. But, in terms of system, economic entities (firms, households,
government bodies) have a nicely shaped behavior: an incremental increase on the
input side yields an incremental change of output. Or more precisely, if one wants
a very small change in output, it is always possible to find a little enough input
to achieve it. This is untrue of natural systems where it is possible to increase an
input (or level of use) for a time without seeing significant changes in the output,
and then reach a point where any incremental increase (however small) results in an
tremendous change of output, with, much of the time, irreversible modifications of the
system itself which switch to a totally different state and is then governed by totally
different equations (see [7] for a good description of non-linear system behavior in an
economic context). Discontinuities do exist in economic activity: oil crisis, financial
crisis, bankruptcy. But there is always the possibility of somehow coming back and
rebuilding. At this point, we do not know how to do that with natural systems [24],
and they are so complex that a technological solution to this problem is unlikely.
Irreversiblity is a key word: when a species is gone, it is really gone forever.
Specialization of systems If property rights are issued, there is a risk that own-
ers will try to specialize the systems for the uses that will provide the biggest benefit
for them. Specialization is a foundation of the market mechanism: normally it per-
mits society to be better off because of the decreasing costs when specializing in one
activity. For instance, if originally A and B both produce goods 1 and 2 while A
can increase its production of good 1 at a lower cost than B, and B that of good
2 at a lower cost than A, they will each specialize and then exchange their goods.
Overall, they are both better off. It is what happened with ecosystems on the land:
we now have on one side crop fields, on the other side a few national parks where
agriculture would have been very expensive. We can imagine such evolution also in
the coastal zone and in the ocean where resources are in their turn becoming scarce.
Some wetlands will specialize in production of sea food, others in waste treatment.
However, such specializations are much more dangerous for a marine ecosystem be-
cause exchanges among the species, and all entities of the system are much more
intense than on land. One cannot treat waste at one point on a river and expect to
produce sea food downstream. One cannot release lead in the marine environment
without expecting it to ultimately concentrate in fish tissues, maybe very far from
the lead source. Much more than ecosystems on land, coastal systems are integrated,
fauna and flora literally "swim" in their environment and constantly exchange matter
with it.
Furthermore, specialization requires the elimination of stochastic variations of the
production. For example, in a given year you may harvest a lot of shellfish but have
little income from recreation because of bad weather. Since you are not specialized,
risk is reduced because you have diversified sources of income. On the other hand,
if you specialize in shellfish production, you will use all the possible technological
tools you have to obtain a steady production over the years. You will not allow the
system to oscillate around a mean value. You reduced what we can call the steady
risk on the system. However, at the same time, you have increased the non-linear
risk of seeing the system collapse completely. We may be beginning to witness this
collapse on land: soils get poorer and poorer, and erosion reduces the total surface
of cultivable land and the amount of top soil. In a coastal environment, this collapse
will occur much faster.
About people's welfare It may be true that a market mechanism on environmen-
tal assets will lead to efficient allocation, and at the least cost. But this efficiency
is measured within the realms of the neo-classical theory. Maybe people feel more
comfortable with no prices on certain goods than with them. And this preference
can not be taken into account in the economic theory since it denies the theory itself.
There is some evidence that this statement is true. We already cited Brown's work.
Another study was conducted by Harris and Brown. People were asked who should
pay for a reduction in nongame wildlife due to land development:
1. the state with tax dollars, or
2. only people for whom wildlife is important, or
3. people responsible for the loss (i.e. developers) ?
People could also answer: the loss of wildlife does not concern me. Only 5% of the
people chose this last possibility. Only 10% chose answer 2. 37% decided that only
people responsible for the loss should pay (answer 3). Answers 2 and 3 can be clearly
assimilated to a "property rights" approach: those who care for wildlife have to pay
if they want to preserve it, and those who destroy wildlife have to buy this right.
The significant finding of the study, which is closely related to our discussion, was
that 53% indicated that the state should pay. A majority of the people consider that
society as a whole is responsible for the loss of wildlife and do not accept the idea of
market mechanisms when the environment is concerned. If increasing people's welfare
is really the aim, property rights must not be issued then. Consequently, there is a
need for indirect valuation processes such as the one we presented.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we tried to show that, despite the values of uses we can reach are
disputable, there is no other real choice but try to enhance the accuracy of these
valuations. This is because orthodox economics are not adapted to the systemic
reality of natural coastal systems.
Valuing each use was the missing part of our methodology which is now complete.
We turn to a case study, the Saugus River System, which illustrates our methodolog-
ical work and addresses the more general problems we raised.
Chapter 6
Background data on the Saugus
River Watershed
In the next two chapters, we are going to try to see how our methodology can be
related to a real case. This chapter concentrates on the definition of the geographical
area of the "valuation unit" and presents a brief assessment of the watershed. Uses,
their interrelationships, and the loss of synergetic effects are dealt with in chapter 7.
The choice of the Saugus River was motivated by the fact that its uses are diver-
sified, which suits our framework, and the existence of a recent baseline study [27]. It
does not take long to reach the heart of the problem. Here is what can be found in a
brochure edited by the Saugus River Watershed Council (the brochure is reproduced
in appendix C):
Today, the Saugus River is used upstream for municipal water supply,
downstream for commercial fishing operations and in between for recre-
ational fishing and boating, open space and recreation along its banks.
Specialization seems preeminent along the river. This mean loss of synergetic value
as we saw. Let us first get acquainted with the system. The following sections give
background data about the Saugus River Watershed through a grid adapted to our
methodology. After a brief description of the river itself, we study the geographical
area of the watershed. We then give a brief assessment of the environmental quality
of our "valuation unit".
6.1 The Saugus river
The Saugus river is 13 miles long. It runs mainly through urbanized areas. Small
lakes cover 10% of the watershed [21]. The headwater source of the river is Lake
Quannapowitt (251 acre) in an area of single family houses. People sail on and jog
around the lake, but under the stress of lawn fertilizers, fecal wastes and erosion
runoffs, the lake may die by eutrophication within decades.
The organically rich waters from the lake travel slowly into the Lynnfield-Wakefield
marsh, which are extensive freshwater marshes, unique in such a urbanized area. In
these marshes, lie the "Ready Meadows", designated a National Natural landmark,
where many endangered species of bird and other typical wetland animals can be
found.
A dam is built on the river, at the border between Lynnfield and Saugus. At
this point, the town of Lynn has its freshwater intake (12.5 million gallons per day
are diverted [26]). This is the only drinking water supply on the river, but it is a
significant one: after the dam, the river is slow moving.
Further south the river passes through the Metropolitan District Commission's
Breakheart Reservation. It is almost pristine at this point, with many hiking trails.
The river passes under route 1 (see figure 6-1 (source: [27]), appendix D gives
more detailed maps) in a heavily commercially developed area. Downstream, the
river passes through residential areas: buildings, houses, parking lots... It is however
often protected by a narrow strip of wetland plants.
A short distance further downstream, after Panker's Pond and a few bending
maples, the river reaches the 17th century Saugus Iron Works. This historical site,
home of the first successful Iron Works of North America, is managed by the National
Park Service.
Below the Iron Works, the river is muddy and slowly adapts to the marine envi-
ronment. Although fetid and covered by a rich organic soup, the brackish waters are
Figure 6-1: The Saugus River Watershed
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considered fundamental to the ocean foodweb. However, almost all along the lower
Saugus, this natural detritus is mixed with human pollutants: construction debris,
yard waste, or household trash.
The last mile of the river is heavily developed with huge plants such as General
Electric or RESCO. The Saugus River joins the Pines River to form the Saugus salt-
marshes. These marshes contain the largest shellfish beds north of Boston. Of course
they have been closed for human consumption. They constitute a nursery for many
species of coastal fish and act has a pollution filter from land to sea, as well as a flood
water buffer.
The coastline around the mouth of the river is mainly residential on the Revere
side, while industrial on the Lynn side.
This description began to show how various are the uses and the states of the river
in terms of environmental assessment. But we have to study the whole watershed,
which we do in the next section.
6.2 The geographical watershed
Our methodology began with the definition of a "valuation unit" which, we said,
cannot be more restricted than a watershed. The Saugus river Watershed is shown
on figure 6-1. Its surface is about 47 square miles, 45% of which is an estuary. The fall
from Lake Quannapowitt to sea level is only 90 feet. The rim around the watershed
has an elevation of only 300 feet. That's one of the reasons why the river is so
"sluggish" (except during storm events). Two other reasons are the slight gradient
(90 feet over 13 miles), and the existence of many small lakes.
Despite its moderate surface, the watershed area encompasses 10 towns. We find
here the two issues we discussed in section 2.1.2: not only is the valuation unit shared
by several communities but some communities are only partly on the valuation unit.
Table 6.1 (source: [26]) gives the list of towns and their relation to the watershed. One
important number is the fraction of the town surface within the watershed. A low
percentage does not necessarily mean that impacts are such however. For example,
Total
1990 Density % of land
Watershed Community area
population . (pple/acre) in wtrshd(sq. miles)
Saugus (town) 25,549 11.58 3.5 100
Wakefield (town) 24,825 7.89 4.9 97
Lynn (city) 81,245 11.21 11.3 79
Revere (city) 42,786 6.32 10.6 70
Lynnfield (town) 11,274 10.49 1.7 53
Malden (city) 53,884 5.13 16.4 45
Melrose (city) 28,150 4.80 9.2 42
Reading (town) 22,539 9.85 3.6 28
Everett (city) 35,701 3.75 14.9 21
Stoneham (town) 22,203 6.66 5.2 10
Peabody (city) 47,039 16.81 4.4 2
Table 6.1: Watershed breakdown by town
only 21% of Everett lies within the watershed - it is the smallest community (3.75
square miles) in terms of area. But this area (west part of the watershed) also has the
highest density and is heavily industrial. Impacts from this area are thus significant.
However, this low percentage, and the fact that the residents of Everett live far from
the river itself, mean little concern from the town of Everett. This a first hint that
the political structure does not favor sound environmental management. We will
elaborate on this in the next chapter.
We also have to prolong our system into the ocean, to insure that it is as weakly
linked as possible with the rest of the world. Since the tidal part of the river is a
nursery for several species of open sea fish. This marine part should expand far from
the coast (as far as the end of the continental shelf, marine ecologists would argue).
To design a reasonable marine area, some hydrologic and ecological studies should
be conducted, maybe the fishing grounds of the ocean fishermen from the Saugus
River should be taken into account also. These studies go beyond the scope of this
work. We know that designing this marine part is a difficult problem because of the
nature of the marine environment: no boundaries for chemicals or species. In order to
continue our case study, we can admit that a marine part has been designed, which
is heavily impacted by the inflow from the watershed and which has also a strong
influence on the coastline of the watershed.
6.3 Baseline assessment of the Saugus River Wa-
tershed
One striking characteristic of the Saugus River is the variation of stream during storm
events. This is due to the reduced base flow during normal conditions, to the runoffs
from the urbanized area and the roads, and to combined sewers overflows. During
these storm events, concentrations of various chemicals can increase by a factor of 20
[27, page 28]. Sediment transportation occurs mainly during these events too, with
all its consequences on the ecosystems: erosion of top-soil, concentration of nutrients,
increase of turbidity...
No major industrial source of pollution can be identified. Water quality is mostly
impaired by organic pollution, domestic and animal. The high coliforms densities in-
dicate sources of pollution such as combined sewer overflows, illegal sewer connections,
and failing individual septic systems. The fertilizers used for golf lawns are another
source of pollution. In places in the watershed, along the non-tidal part of the river
in particular, heavily polluted stagnant pools can be observed. Their assimilative
capacity is extremely low, and they are very sensitive to a change of inputs.
The biological picture of the watershed is poor. The low numbers of species and
individuals of fish, invertebrates, or diatoms indicate poor water quality. This is
especially true of the non-tidal part of the basin. The estuarine part is in better
condition due to the tidal flushing. Although there remain some natural habitats
(around Lake Quannapowitt, in the Ready Meadows, in the tidal marsh), they have
unusually poor populations of fish and invertebrates. As it is put in the baseline
assessment of the Saugus River prepared by Hudsonia Limited [27, page 37]:
Habitat fragmentation has reduced the areas of suitable habitats, in-
creasing the risk of random extinctions[.]
6.4 Conclusion
To sum up, the Saugus River watershed is fragmented into parts which have very
different environmental quality. But even the area which look pristine are in fact
affected: reduced number of species, and small populations of each species. Now that
we have defined the geographical area of the system, and have a better general idea
of the watershed, we turn to the uses of the system.
Chapter 7
The Saugus River system
In this chapter we describe the uses of the system. We try to show that, due to
interactions among them, only a valuation such as the one we presented could lead
to the most efficient management of the system. Finally we underline the difficulties
of implementing our methodology.
7.1 Description of uses
The uses we have found for the Saugus River system are listed bellow. The list may
not be complete. The idea is to use the case study as an illustration of the theoretical
part of this work. A study useful for decision making purposes would require more
time, and consider the socio-political dimensions of the system as well. We tried to
order the uses according to the classification we described in chapter 3. There again,
this ordering may be disputable in terms of ecological validity.
Class 1 This class contains only the ground water recharge use. We could not
gather enough geological information to know whether or not this function exists in
the system. Answering this question would of course be critical to a real study. For
our purpose, we assume that, due to the geology of the basin, this use does not exist.
Class 2
1. Fecal matter retention and filtration. As a whole the Saugus River system
is a huge fecal matter filter. This use is carried out by Lake Quannapowitt, by
the Lynnfield-Wakefield marsh, by the tidal marsh, but also all along the river.
This matter comes mainly from combined sewer overflows, illegal connections
to the sewer system, deficient septic systems. But wildlife participates to the
amount of fecal matter entering the system as well. It has been noticed that
geese seem to enjoy the habitat provided by golf courses (1% of the watershed).
Their population has increased rapidly and they do not migrate to Canada any
more.
2. Retention of nutrients and toxins. We don't mention the origin of the
pollutants. The watershed is mainly residential, but there are also several in-
dustries with discharge permits. The Saugus salt marsh encompasses a huge
plant owned by General Electric and the RESCO plant. For years these com-
panies have discharged illegal levels of toxic substances and heat. It does not
seem to be true any more, and GE is now involved in environmental actions to
protect the marsh [26, page 29].
3. Drinking water production. The city of Lynn has an historical right to
divert water from the river to the last drop. This intake is outside the town
boundary. We will study this use of the river in details.
4. Waste dumping. People use the tidal marsh, and some points along the
river (around route 1 and 128) as a waste products disposal (household trash,
construction debris).
Class 3
1. Flood protection. The Lynnfield-Wakefield marsh acts as a buffer during
storms by temporarily stocking huge amounts of water coming from the upper
part of the watershed. This is a non-commercial matter related use. Estimating
the avoided costs from damages should be easier than the replacement cost
method because the flood control function is closely tied to the existence of
the system, even if the system is in a very degraded environmental quality. Its
virtual replacement would imply the study of many other uses.
2. Storm damages protection. The tidal marshes in the estuary protect the
land from the damages caused by the sea. This is a very classical function
of wetlands, but the protection does not apply to houses and buildings only:
the marsh protects area where shellfish could be harvested (if pollution did not
prevent this use). The study by the Department of the Army [21], although
about a project of artificially improved protection, gives ideas about the extent
of the natural protection.
3. Golf courses. Although golf is a recreational activity, a golf course requires
such modifications of landscape that they can enter this class. The shape and
open spaces let runoffs run freely. Fertilizers are used intensively to maintain
the course. We saw that golf courses have also a function as habitat for geese
which produce a lot of fecal matter.
Class 4
1. Production of shellfish. This use of the tidal marshes has been lost due to
pollution: an example of collapse of a use. It is nonetheless a critical use of the
system, the shellfish industry being a traditional one in New England.
2. Nursery area for offshore commercial fish. This use is transcendental un-
less the marine zone of the system encompasses the area where fishermen catch
the fish which is spawned in the Saugus tidal marsh. This is not practicable
since most species are fished far from the shore even though they spawn in the
coastal marshes. The valuation of the system is thus independent of the way
the fishery is managed, and because of that, there will be some errors in the val-
uation: a species can become extinct because of artificially at sea, even though
the Saugus river system is well managed and able to fulfill the spawning func-
tion. Besides, young fish nurturing in the tidal marsh may have a benefactory
effect on the marsh (and thus on the value of the system), but their population
depends on a variable extrogeneous to the valuation process: the amount of fish
caught at sea. It is not possible to avoid methodological errors when valuing
this use because we have to design a practicable, limited marine part of the
system.
Class 5
1. Hiking, bird watching, and enjoying natural sites. All along the river
there are some spots which still look untouched by development and pollution.
The tidal marsh, the Reedy Meadows, and Lake Quannappowitt are the areas
where people enjoy nature most. The number of people hiking around Lake
Quannapowitt can reach 15,000 in a week-end [26, page 25]. As a comparison,
the town of Saugus has 25,000 inhabitants.
2. Fishing. Fishermen use the estuary at the mouth of the river to fish striped
bass. Freshwater fishing along the river seem to be another example of collapse
of a use: the river is very poor in freshwater species. But this may change if the
water quality improves, which justifies that we study the benefits of this use.
3. Boating. Lake Quannapowitt is a famous urban wind pocket. Sailors and
sailboarders fill the water. The marine estuary part is also used as a boating
area.
4. Research and education. The Lynnfield-Wakefield marsh as well as the
Saugus salt marshes are valuable for research work and educational purposes.
They both cover vast surfaces (at least compared to most marshes within ur-
banized areas) and are habitats to endangered species. We already said how
difficult it is to assess the value of this benefit. But it must not be ignored.
5. Aesthetics. People living close to the river, a wetland, or on the coastline,
enjoy the aesthetics of the site. This may be measured, by an increase in real
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Figure 7-1: Sum up of uses for the Saugus River system
estate prices, or by contingent methods, which are more likely to capture all the
aspects of the satisfaction provided by pleasant aesthetics.
7.2 Relationships among the uses
Figure 7-1 sums up the uses of the system. We now turn to the synergetic effects
among the uses. The idea of synergy comes from the influence of some uses on others.
These relations are in pairs: one use may influence 3, 4 or all others. We will study
~
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some relationships in more details in the next section. Here we tried to design a
general benefit-benefit relation diagram. Figure 7-2 shows the result of this attempt.
It is natural that the uses of the lower class end up in the middle of the diagram: we
know that they have strong impacts on all upper classes. Some relations are missing
on the figure: we tried to put the most obvious ones, and keep the figure readable.
The relation between two uses is generally carried out by a maintenance function,
but a single maintenance function serves as a link between several uses and is also
part of the dynamics of the system: relationships go further than this benefit-benefit
analysis. As we saw, the consequence is that a transaction between only two uses has
no reason to go in the direction of the maximization of the value of the system: the
impact of this transaction on other uses is external to the transaction.
Such diagrams can be drawn for benefit-risk. We can for example study the
influence of an increase in nutrient retention on the risk of seeing boating disappear
because of complete eutrophication of the lake. Figure 7-2 showed that, in terms of
benefits, eutrophication did have an influence on the benefits to society of boating:
the more algae in the water, the less pleasant it is to sail (especially when there is a
risk of capsizing...). However, the benefit-risk analysis would be different: how many
years from now, for a given amount of nutrient, will the system shift to a state where
boating become unpleasant enough so that this use disappears completely ? Benefit-
risk diagrams are likely to be even more intricate: for example, turbidity of the water
is critical the survival of the vegetation which maintains the storm protection of a
tidal marsh. What is the probability that, say 20 years from now, the waste dumped
in the marsh will have changed the turbidity in such a drastic way that the system
disappear almost completely and storm protection is no longer available ? There
are many degrees of freedom in our system: each use has a monetary and a risk
dimension, and all uses interact. A general risk-risk diagram would have had less
meaning than the benefit-benefit one we draw. The next section contains an example
of a risk-benefit diagram.
We are now going to study two examples which will show that misvaluation leads
to the loss of the benefits of synergy among uses and the loss of the uses themselves.
Increase load
(geese)
Use of land
Figure 7-2: General benefit-benefit qualitative analysis
Erosion
Just like we did now, the analysis will remain qualitative. For decision making pur-
poses, quantitative data would be needed though.
7.3 Two developed examples
7.3.1 The water intake
As we said, the city of Lynn has the right to divert all the water from the Saugus
River, at a point situated downstream of the Lynnfield-Wakefield marsh. In terms
of property rights, the net benefit of this right equals what it would cost Lynn to
use another source of drinkable water (pumping underground water for example).
However, in terms of the valuation unit as a system, the consequences of this use are
enormous. They are enormous not only because this use has impacts on the other
uses of the system, but also because it has impacts on the risk facing the system. In
figure 7-3, we tried to show the relation between the drinkable water use on other
uses in terms of benefits. As we know, this is only a partial view of the system. Risk
also has to be taken into account. Figure 7-4 shows the relations between the level of
benefits from drinkable water and the level of risk on other uses.
On the monetary dimension, it seems that the value of the system would increase
a lot if the water were not diverted any more, so that this move would have a positive
Net Present Value. But things go further: the risk of seeing other functions collapse
would be reduced too. As far as benefits and risk are concerned, stopping diverting
water from the Saugus River seems a win-win situation for the system. Figure 7-5,
where risk represents a hypothetical aggregated risk of the system, illustrates this
situation.
As a matter of fact, a minimum flow requirement was recently imposed under the
authority of the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management, Water
Resources Division. The standard was based on a study carried out on another
river from the Saugus [26, page 24] and is very controversial. The real questions
are the following: Why wasn't this process undertaken earlier ? Why wasn't this
Figure 7-3: Influence of drinkable water production benefits on other uses' benefits
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Figure 7-4: Influence of drinkable water production benefits on other uses' risk
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Figure 7-5: Effects of reducing the water withdrawal
standard the result of a negotiation among the communities of the watershed ? A
neo-classical analysis would state that the city of Lynn has a property right to the
water. Communities (like Saugus) having interest in a more substantial base flow
along the Saugus River should then buy this property right. How would the price be
determined ? From the city of Lynn side, a fair price would be the loss of benefit from
withdrawing water from the river: that is, the increase in price from taking water
from the river to taking it from another source. From the other communities side,
a fair price may be the increase of benefits due to a bigger flow along the Saugus.
Through mutual agreement, it seems that the transaction could take place. In fact,
there are at least three reasons explaining why it has not and has little chance to:
1. If the increase in cost is easy to estimate, the increased benefits (recreation,
aesthetics) are much more difficult to value. They are so difficult to value
in fact, that communities do not compare them to the price required by the
city of Lynn: they only consider this price, and it may seem high. There is a
basic problem of valuation here: the transaction does not take place because
of an erroneous valuation of the total benefits derived from the natural system.
Conducting a process such as the one we presented may help assess the real
benefits from a healthier system.
Monetary value
of system
Reduce monetary benefits of
water withdrawal
Background situation
Risk
2. The benefits do not go only to one community: they are spread unevenly among
many. Even though Saugus is the community geographically closest to the water
intake, uses such as fecal matter filtration or recreation involve Melrose and
Malden as well. However, in the short term, these two communities can enjoy
the benefits of these uses without the problem of having a polluted river on their
territory. All the uses interact together without regard to the jurisdiction areas,
and each community tries to play the game to its own advantage, disregarding
the value of the system as a whole. Only a valuation, based on the value of the
entire system, with a clear view of the time span used, and on the interactions
among the uses, followed by a negotiation on distribution issues, can lead to
the proper decision.
3. A necessary condition for the withdrawal of water by the town of Lynn is the
existence of the Lynnfield-Wakefield marsh. The water entering the marsh is
loaded with nutrients, fecal matter, and other pollutants. This is true of the
water coming from Lake Quannapowitt as we saw, but, more generally, all the
headwater area is the site of loaded runoffs. The marsh acts as a filter and
regulates the flow, so that, at its downstream point, the water can be used for
municipal use. The value of the water withdrawal thus depends on the environ-
mental quality of the Lynnfield-Wakefield marsh. Should Lynn participate in
the cost of protecting this wetland since it is one of its main user ? We see that
all the communities upstream from the water intake are also parties. This is no
surprise and illustrates what we explained earlier: only a systemic approach can
lead to accurate valuation and efficient management of the natural resources.
This example tried to show that, given the relationships among the uses, only
a process that take the whole system into account can yield the highest benefit to
society. We will see in the next section why such an approach is difficult to apply.
We now turn to the case of Lake Quannapowitt.
7.3.2 Lake Quannapowitt
The process of eutrophication is a natural one. Undisturbed, Lake Quannapowitt
would die slowly by a natural process. But accelerated erosion, fecal waste and
other nutrients, and the fact that the water of the lake are well oxygenated due to the
windy conditions, accelerate this process. Once more, not only the value of recreation
decreases (eutrophication makes boating less pleasant, not to mention swimming), but
there is a very tangible risk that the use will disappear altogether.
Today, the lake water is loaded with nutrients and other pollutants. Here is what
can be found in the baseline assessment of the Saugus River Watershed:
The flow of Lake Quannapowitt water into the Saugus [River] should
be minimized until the lake's water quality can be assessed.
In order to preserve the Lynnfield-Wakefield marsh (which is in turn very important
to the production of Lynn's municipal water), it seems natural to take this step. In
the short run, the lake will continue to perform its nutrient retention function and
the marsh will be preserved as a habitat for endangered species and for production of
drinkable water. In fact, this decision seems to be a first step toward the specialization
of two subcomponents of the system. In the short term, the lake can receive all the run
offs coming from the upper part of the watershed, with reduced boating attractiveness,
while the marsh will be left for lovers of pristine environment, and those who have
interest in the production of drinkable water.
But how long will the lake be able to accumulate nutrients before the ecosystem
collapses ? What will happen next ? There is no insurance that the value of the
system is increased by this specialization. Of course the real problem lies at the
source of runoffs in the upper part of the watershed. Reducing them would have a
huge cost compared to the specialization solution. On one hand we have a low cost
solution but which increases the risk to the system, on the other hand a high cost
solution which reduces the risk. The dilemma is precisely that of figure 4-1.
The political process is important in this issue too. Reducing runoffs in the head-
water would influence all other uses of the system and have beneficial effects for
all the communities in the watershed. It may even make it possible to go on with
deficient combined sewer systems in the downstream part of the watershed if the
headwater is clean. Who shall bear the cost then ? Can the political process handle
this issue ? Valuing the system as a whole, applying the decisions that the valuation
implies requires either centralized power or, at least, a very close cooperation among
all the communities within the system. It requires 1) an understanding of the sys-
tem, 2) reasonable estimates of the value of the system, 3) a long term view by all
the decision-makers involved. It does not seem that this point has been reached yet.
In Massachusetts particularly, where "local rule" has a long and powerful tradition,
community collaboration over watersheds will be difficult.
7.4 Conclusion
The Saugus River has been slowly segmented in pieces, each of which is specialized,
losing the synergetic effects among uses and increasing the risk for each of these. Only
a valuation based on the entire system, with all of its interrelated uses, can show the
monetary and risk related benefits which could arise from limiting each use to a level
which improves synergy within the system instead of destroying it. The political
process limits the possibility of seeing such a methodology applied. We develop these
three points to conclude our study of the Saugus River System. But before that, let
us repeat once more that this case study serves only as an illustrative example. The
information gathered during the limited time of this work is surely not sufficient to
insure that all the data are precise.
The specialization of subcomponents of the system The example of Lake
Quannapowitt tried to illustrate this tendency. The phenomenon is found all along
the river however. It is so true that the baseline assessment of the Saugus River
Watershed begins with the definition of 7 zones along the river [27, page 7], each of
which has a privileged use. This specialization means:
1. loss of benefits from higher class uses: stagnant pools rich in fecal matter are
not aesthetically pleasing, nor do they allow for other enjoyable activities,
2. loss of synergetic effects among uses: withdrawing water from the river yields
benefits but, because the maintenance effect from a regular stream disappears,
species die and the filtration of pollutants is decreasing,
3. increased risk of seeing some uses collapse: shellfish in the tidal part are no
longer harvested.
Benefits and synergy. The study showed that the components of the system
(different areas, uses, and maintenance functions) are so linked to each other that
a neo-classical property rights/market mechanism approach would not lead to an
efficient management of the system. To reach an accurate value of the system, it
has to be considered as a whole. Moreover, the increase of wealth to society coming
from expenses to maintain the good environmental quality of the system, and make
sure that any and all the different uses do not reduce the synergetic effects of the
system cannot be measured only in terms of monetary benefits: such actions would
also reduce the risk of seeing uses collapse.
Problems of implementation The political structure of the system is not favor-
able to an approach which puts an emphasis on the system. There are more than ten
towns in the valuation unit. Most of them have interest in other valuation units as
well. State and federal agencies are numerous but their power is limited to a certain
aspect or area of the system only. They also may have competing interests. The
time frame for political life (typically 4 years) tends to promote projects with short
term benefit even when they imply long term disastrous consequences. Improving
the political part of the decision making and implementation process is a challenging
one. Better incentive systems have to be created in the form of new structures. New
ways to communicate information and better vehicles for reaching agreements have
to be found.
Chapter 8
General conclusion
To conclude, let us first sum up the steps that have to be taken to apply the valuation
process we described.
1. Define the geographical area of the system. It is composed of at least one
watershed extended by a marine part.
2. Define the uses of the system, a set of maintenance functions, and a set of
indicators.
3. Value each use (all uses) in monetary terms as accurately as possible.
4. Determine the relationships among the uses in terms of monetary benefits, but
also in terms of risk. This may require the study of the internal dynamics of
the system and the links between uses and maintenance functions.
In general, the methodology tries to keep the advantages of an economic valuation
while taking into account the interrelations among uses, the fact that the system is a
whole, and the existence of a valuable synergy among all the uses of the system.
The development of this work suggested more general results about the use of eco-
nomic methods to help manage natural systems as well. First, traditional valuations
are erroneous because they leave aside the intricate relations among uses, which come
from the dynamics of the system. They are also unable to capture the value of the
synergetic effects among uses. Secondly, the neo-classical approach to environmental
problems is likely to lead to the specialization of ecosystems through assignment of
property rights. This means the loss of the synergetic values, and also an increased
risk of seeing the system collapse. This comes from the gap between economic theory
and the complex dynamics of natural systems, the behavior of which becomes unpre-
dictable when they are placed under too strong a stress. Lastly, indirect economic
valuations, such as the one we tried to present, are useful since people do not seem to
agree with the attribution of property rights on environmental assets. The challenge
is to improve these valuations. That is what this work tried to do.
The political process is an obstacle to the use of such valuations, and the appli-
cation of decisions they suggest. The multiple areas of jurisdiction, both in terms
of geography and mission, have nothing to do with the ecological reality of natural
systems. There is a real challenge in this domain where research would be helpful:
structures have to be invented that allow the respect of natural systems. The nego-
tiation process has to be studied and improved. Further research is of course also
needed to fulfill step 3 of our process. This work would be mainly ecology but with
a bias toward the uses of the system, and the determination of risk of collapse.
This study may lead to further research or it may not. This is not really what is
important. Its starting point lay in the feeling that natural systems are significantly
undervalued in our society. If this work helps a little to approach the true value of
natural systems, and this before they are gone, the aim will be reached.
Appendix A
Information for the general public
about the Saugus River
Watershed
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Appendix B
Net Present Value calculations
and time scales
The Net Present Value criterion consists in the following steps.
1. Evaluate expected cash flows related to the project in the years to come for
each year: ECFo, ECF1, ECF2 ... These cash flows can be positive or negative.
2. Discount each cash flow with the chosen discount rate (r) according to its year
of occurrence to obtain their present value, or discounted cash flow. In year n:
DCFn = ECFn/(1 + r)n .
3. Add all the discounted cashflows from year 0 to infinity to obtain the Net
Present value (NPV) of the project: NPV = F,=o DCFi.
4. If the result is positive, the project has a positive Net Present Value, the amount
of which represents the increase of wealth due to the project, expressed in
today's monetary terms. If the result is negative, society is better off without
carrying out the project.
Now let's imagine a project which produce a cash flow of $1 each year. When n
increases, the discount factor 1/(1 + r)" becomes so small that the contribution of
the dollar in year n to the NPV becomes negligible. As an example we computed the
Table B.1: DCF's for a stream of $1 with a 7% discount rate
discounted cash flows of our stream of $1 each year for a discount rate of 7% from
year 0 to year 50. Table B.1 shows the results.
Given the incertitude on the cash flows in an environmental context, taking into
account the contributions after year 40 makes no sense. Implicitly, we use a 40 years
time scale. Moreover, this time scale would be shorter if the cash flows became $.5
after say year 15, and this without any relation with the ecological reality of the
system studied.
Appendix C
Brochure edited by the Saugus
River Watershed Council
TOWN RIVER MILES 96 OF TOWN PRIMARY
WITHIN WITHIN USES WITHIN
TOWN WATERSHED WATERSHED
SAUGUS 85 100 I.R.C
REVERE 2.0 70 I.R.C
LYNN 2.0 79 I.R.C
LYNNFIELD 2.5 53 C.R
WAKEFIELD 4.5 97 I.R
EVERETT 0 21 I.R.C
READING 0 28 I,R.C
MALDEN 0 45 R
MELROSE O 42 R.C
STONEHAM 0 10 R
PEABIOD 0 2 R
I- INDUSTRIAL. R- RESIDENTIAL, C- COMMERCIAL
THE SAUGUS RIVER WATERSHED COUNCIL
"The Saugus River is a vital re-
source which can provide many
uses to the residents of the Saugus
River watershed, including fishing.
canoeing, swimming or just getting
back to nature. By becoming more
aware of this valuable river and its
history, we. as citizens, can help
restore its beauty and its recreation
opportunities."
Joe Vinard
President
Saugus (:(operative Bank
The Saugus River Watershed Council is a non-
profit organization concerned with the health
and beauty of the Saugus River and its watershed.
Organized in March. 1991. as the Saugus River
Advocacy Group. we have organized interpretive
walks and educational exhibits, lobbied for
)rotection of the river, inventoried the river andl
its hanks, begun a water quality testing program,.
worked on fish habitat restoration., participatedl
inI river cleantups and reaclhed olit to other
olrganliations to work togethll oin colnserviing lIlt-
S;.ugus River.
We enlcoullage youi tojjoin us. Walk ,or canoc Ithe-
river: get your hands mluddy inll a ionlise'rvatliin/i
restoration project; promote the SaKtlus River
through advocacy, education, field trips ald
special events. We otifr many ways for vou to get
involved.
Please ( ciliplete tile inembcershilIp frmii on the
back of Itlis panel and returnn Io the Saugus River
Watershed Ciouncil along with volur conltributionl
It stll)lortl the work of the C(ouncil.
I'lhe Salinus River Watershed Countdll has twen
a;ssisied bv [I'he National lPark Service Rivers,
l'rails a ndl (:Conservation Assistance Prograin.
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Appendix D
Detailed maps of the Saugus River
Source: [26]
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